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Robert F Gray, Jr., * Katie-Pat Vletas,**
and Steven A. Waters***
A. Corporation Case Law Developments
1. Corporate Disregard
IMILAR to the treatment of corporate disregard during last year's
Survey period, Texas courts have, for the most part, solidified the sor-
cerer's apprentice role played by the Texas Supreme Court in Castle-
berry v. Branscum.1 Pan Eastern Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils2 represents
one of the cases in this area that attempts to make sense of Castleberry. The
plaintiffs in Pan Eastern, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (Anadarko), and
its wholly owned subsidiary, Pan Eastern Exploration Company (Pan East-
ern Exploration), composed part of a related group of corporations operat-
ing in the oil and gas industry. The plaintiffs brought suit against Panhandle
Eastern Pipeline Company (Panhandle Eastern) and others3 claiming that
the defendant owners of oil and casinghead gas rights had unjustly produced
the plaintiffs' dry gas while other defendants had purchased and transported
the converted dry gas. The defendants asserted that they did not wrongfully
convert the plaintiffs' dry gas, and, alternatively, even if they did take the
plaintiffs' gas, it was with the consent of the plaintiffs or Panhandle Eastern,
an affiliated corporation, whose acts were binding on the plaintiffs. The de-
fendants successfully argued that the plaintiffs' sister corporations had con-
sented to the defendants' taking their gas and that this consent estopped
plaintiffs from complaining that their gas had been wrongfully converted.
The jury rejected the plaintiffs' claim and the defendants' cross-claims, and
the court granted a take-nothing judgment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed in part, but held that any consent to the defendants' actions
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would have ended at the time the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit and that the
plaintiffs should be entitled to recover damages sustained thereafter. 4
An understanding of the case requires a detailed discussion of the parties
involved. Originally, Panhandle Eastern, the parent of Anadarko, held the
gas leases in dispute. Panhandle Eastern later assigned the leases to Pan
Eastern Exploration, a subsidiary of Anadarko, and conveyed the stock of
Anadarko to Panhandle Eastern's corporate parent, Panhandle Eastern Cor-
poration (PEC). Thus, Panhandle Eastern became an affiliate of Anadarko
and Pan Eastern Exploration rather than their parent. Anadarko operated
as a fully functioning exploration and production company; Pan Eastern Ex-
ploration existed merely as a shell corporation, with only one employee.
Anadarko managed Pan Eastern Exploration's day-to-day business affairs,
while Panhandle Eastern operated Pan Eastern Exploration's gas wells as an
independent contractor. The officers and directors of Panhandle Eastern,
Anadarko, and Pan Eastern Exploration overlapped, but did not mirror each
other. In preparing the financial statements and the required periodic re-
ports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the companies
consolidated their profits and losses. The corporate formalities of each of
these companies, however, were strictly observed at all times.
The defendants may be categorized as: (i) the "operator defendants," who
produced the oil from the properties in dispute (which category includes
Hufo Oils and Ted True, Inc., two of the well operators); (ii) the "processing
defendants," who installed gas plants on the properties and processed the gas
produced by the operator defendants; and (iii) the "pipeline defendants,"
who, along with Panhandle Eastern, purchased gas from the operator and
processing defendants.
At the heart of the plaintiffs' claim lies the controversy surrounding the
casinghead gas wells drilled during the early 1980s, when demand for natu-
ral gas soared. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the mechanism
by which the holders of oil rights on "split leases" (properties where the
right to produce gas has been severed from the right to produce oil and
casinghead gas) would convert what would otherwise be a statutory gas well
into a statutory oil well, thereby entitling them to produce casinghead gas. 5
The operator defendants had used this mechanism to produce casinghead
gas from the properties in dispute, thus giving the plaintiffs a potential cause
of action for the conversion of their dry gas.
In the early 1980s, Hufo Oils acquired the oil and casinghead gas rights in
the properties. Then, in late 1981, Hufo Oils approached Panhandle East-
ern's gas purchasing agent, John Gurche, to see if Panhandle Eastern would
purchase the casinghead gas that Hufo planned to produce. Despite Pan-
handle Eastern's need for additional gas supplies, Richard Dixon, Gurche's
supervisor, ordered Panhandle Eastern to cease all casinghead gas purchases
while it attempted to assess the risks involved in purchasing gas from the
4. Pan Eastern, 855 F.2d at 1129.
5. See id. at 1111-13.
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"white oil" operators.6 Panhandle Eastern later decided that it would accept
the offer from Hufo. In reaching its decision, Panhandle Eastern reasoned
that if Panhandle Eastern didn't purchase the gas, someone else would likely
purchase it, and, if rumors proved true that some companies commingled
dry gas with casinghead gas, then Pan Eastern Exploration's wells could
well be drained and the group of affiliated companies would lose the dry gas
entirely. The Hufo Oils contract required Hufo Oils to steadily increase its
casinghead gas production. The contract also called for Panhandle Eastern
to honor a three-phase obligation to expand and improve its gathering facili-
ties and to take or pay for the growing quantities of gas made available as a
result of this increased operation. Concern that Hufo Oils' wells might drain
Pan Eastern Exploration's and Anadarko's gas reserves prompted Panhan-
dle Eastern officials to include in the contract a special definition for casing-
head gas7 intended to protect them from possible claims by Panhandle
Eastern's affiliates based on Hufo Oils' production practices.
Panhandle Eastern began purchasing gas from Hufo Oils' wells in Febru-
ary 1982. Defendant Ted True, Inc. succeeded Hufo Oils as operator in
November 1982, and began to prepare for increased gas production. Then,
in late 1982 and early 1983, the demand for gas suddenly and sharply de-
creased, and Dixon ordered his buyers to cease all new gas purchases. He
also sent telegrams to Panhandle Eastern's producers instructing them to
defer any new drilling. When Gurche met with Ted True in early 1983,
True reported that he still intended to develop gas at a fast pace and would
hold Panhandle Eastern to its obligation under the contract to take or pay
for up to 60,000 mcf of gas per day. Panhandle Eastern attempted to termi-
nate the Hufo Oils contract to induce True to seek other gas purchasers.
True ultimately entered into an agreement to sell his gas to defendant Liquid
Energy Corporation, but only after a vice president of Panhandle Eastern
confirmed to Liquid Energy that Panhandle Eastern had no objections to
Liquid Energy's proposed contract with True.
The defendants argued that plaintiffs' managers were aware that the drill-
ing and production practices of Hufo and True might be producing gas that
belonged to the plaintiffs, yet Panhandle Eastern's desperate need for more
gas induced them to continue the Hufo Oils contract. The Fifth Circuit
focused specifically on the behavior of three key persons: Dixon, a Senior
Vice President of gas supply at Panhandle Eastern, the chief executive officer
of Pan Eastern Exploration, and a director of Anadarko; Robert Allison, the
chief executive officer of Anadarko, a director of Anadarko, Pan Eastern
Exploration and Panhandle Eastern, and a group vice president of Panhan-
dle Eastern; and Richard O'Shields, the Chairman of the Board of Panhan-
6. "White oil" operators refers to those owners and operators of oil wells that produced
casinghead gas from dry gas formations. Id. at 1112.
7. The contract defined casinghead gas as "all of Seller's interest in gas which is pro-
duced from a reservoir in association with crude oil or is dispersed in and in intimate contact
with crude oil and may be legally produced from a well classified as an oil well by the Texas
Railroad Commission." Id. at 1113 n. 13.
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die Eastern and Anadarko and a director of Pan Eastern Exploration.8 At
the time Panhandle Eastern imposed its moratorium on casinghead gas
purchases in early 1982, Allison became concerned that the independent gas
producers might unlawfully take Anadarko's and Pan Eastern Exploration's
dry gas and suggested to Dixon and O'Shields that Panhandle Eastern stop
buying casinghead gas from the independents. Both Dixon and O'Shields
generally responded that there would be no changes in Panhandle Eastern's
buying practices.
When Pan Eastern Exploration and Anadarko brought suit in 1985 they
did not name their sister corporation, Panhandle Eastern, as a party to the
suit. The defendants joined Panhandle Eastern as a third-party defendant,
however, and urged that Panhandle Eastern merely constituted an alter ego
of plaintiffs Pan Eastern Exploration and Anadarko. The jury found in
favor of the defendants on their affirmative defenses. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit identified four central issues: (i) whether the plaintiffs consented to
the taking of their gas; (ii) whether their affiliate, Panhandle Eastern, con-
sented to the taking of the gas, and, if it did, whether its consent would bind
the plaintiffs; (iii) whether sufficient reasons existed for disregarding the cor-
porate distinctions between the plaintiffs and their parent and sister compa-
nies; and (iv) whether the plaintiffs should be estopped from claiming
conversion because of their own behavior or the behavior of their agents or
alter egos. 9
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' affiliate, Panhandle Eastern, rep-
resented the plaintiffs' alter ego or, in the alternative, that Panhandle East-
ern acted as an agent of the plaintiffs so that Panhandle Eastern's acts were
binding on the plaintiffs. The defendants also asserted that the plaintiffs,
through their corporate management, consented to the taking. The Fifth
Circuit noted, in reviewing the latter argument, that Dixon, Allison, and
O'Shields, as the chief executive officers of Pan Eastern Exploration, its par-
ent Anadarko, and Anadarko's parent, respectively, had the power and the
duty to maximize profits for the entire family of corporations.' 0 The three
men had the power to risk gas losses by the plaintiffs to help Panhandle
Eastern in its time of gas shortage. Whether or not, as a matter of their
duties of care and loyalty to the plaintiffs, they should have so decided, they
had the power and authority to act for the plaintiffs and they did so, to
plaintiffs' detriment. To find for the defendants, the jury had only to con-
clude that the plaintiffs' management knowingly accepted the loss of gas to
further other corporate goals. The Fifth Circuit found evidence to support
that conclusion. I '
The plaintiffs argued that their corporate management's knowledge of or
acquiescence in the defendants' taking should not be imputed to the plaintiffs
because the acts of an agent should not bind a principal unless the agent
8. Pan Eastern, 855 F.2d at 1113.
9. Id. at 1122.
10. Id. at 1126.
11. Id. at 1128.
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acted within the course and scope of its authority and in the best interests of
the principal. The court concluded that by virtue of the Texas Supreme
Court's holding in Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. Boyle General Tire
Co.,12 Texas follows the Restatement (First) of Agency rule, which imputes
all knowledge of an agent (except that acquired in confidence) to his current
principal.1 3 The plaintiffs also argued that their management's consent was
not in their best interests and thus should not be imputed to them. The Fifth
Circuit rejected this argument as well.' 4 It reasoned that the corporate fic-
tion should be disregarded where a manager's decision to help the sole share-
holder at the expense of the corporation would violate some "surrealistic"
duty of care or loyalty to the corporation.15 The court further found that
the plaintiffs' analogy to self-dealing was misplaced because even if the plain-
tiffs' managers did something so harmful to plaintiffs as to violate their duty
of care or loyalty, that violation would only give rise to a cause of action by
the plaintiff corporations against their managers and would not absolve the
plaintiffs of their responsibility to third parties.' 6
The trial court instructed the jury on four affirmative defenses raised by
the defendants (waiver, ratification, estoppel, and laches), each of which re-
quired an implicit finding that Panhandle Eastern was the agent of the plain-
tiffs or that the corporate distinction between them should be disregarded.
Before addressing the issue of defendants' affirmative defenses, the Fifth Cir-
cuit attempted to decipher the reasoning of the Castleberry court concerning
corporate disregard as applied to Texas corporations. From the Castleberry
opinion, the court discerned three distinct theories under Texas law for dis-
regarding the corporate entity.17
The court defined the first theory of corporate disregard under Texas law,
the "alter ego" doctrine, as "when a corporation is organized and operated
as a mere tool or business conduit of another corporation." The focus of this
theory is the relationship between the corporation and its controlling share-
holder, as opposed to the relationship between the corporation and the third-
party claimant.' 8 The second theory identified in Castleberry, the "illegal
purpose" theory, relates to the use of the corporate form to avoid legal limi-
tations on natural persons or corporations. 19 As with the alter ego doctrine,
the focus of this theory is on the relationship between the corporation, its
owners, and the laws of the state, rather than the relationship between the
third-party claimant and the corporation. 20 Illegal purpose, as defined in
Castleberry, differs from the alter ego doctrine in that a party may allege the
former even when all corporate formalities have been adequately observed. 21
12. 392 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Tex. 1965).




17. Id. at 1131.
18. Id. at 1131-32.





The third theory of corporate disregard recognized by Castleberry is "sham
to perpetrate a fraud," which requires neither actual fraud nor an intent to
defraud. 22 If recognition of the separate corporate entity would bring about
an inequitable result, then such a finding of fact by the jury sufficiently estab-
lishes a claim of sham to perpetrate a fraud. 23 The Fifth Circuit recognized
the need to limit the application of this theory, stating, "[t]he only limitation
on this broad strand of corporate disregard is that the focus is on injustice or
unfairness to the claimant caused by the corporation and its owners. The un-
fairness must be something greater than the mere failure to recover a full
measure of damages .... 24
Recognizing that in a contractual corporate disregard case based upon the
sham to perpetrate a fraud theory, "reasonable reliance" upon the financial
backing of the corporation's shareholders is required before the corporate
entity may be disregarded, 25 the Fifth Circuit went on to note that under
Texas law "[i]n contract cases (or in any case based on deliberate acts), the
inequity frequently comes from reasonable reliance on the financial backing
of the owners. Without reliance, the contract claimant cannot avoid the risk
of insolvency that it originally accepted as part of the bargain." 2 6
The trial court submitted questions to the jury on all three theories of
corporate disregard. In reviewing the jury instructions, the Fifth Circuit
found that the defendants produced no evidence indicating any improprieties
in the manner in which the plaintiffs, their parent, or any affiliate were oper-
ated.2 7 Thus, the alter ego issue should never have been submitted to the
jury. 28 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit held that a persuasive circumvention
of law argument for the defendants never existed. 29 The court noted the
inconsistency in the defendants' argument; the defendants claimed that Pan-
handle Eastern's great need for more gas forced Hufo Oils to drill more wells
per section than was permitted by the Texas Railroad Commission, yet the
defendants consistently maintained that they never violated any statute or
Texas Railroad Commission rules. 30 Through these arguments the defend-
ants refuted their own defense!3 1 As a result, the illegal purpose theory was
not applicable to the plaintiffs' conduct. 32 The Fifth Circuit, however, did
find that the jury properly addressed the issue of sham to perpetrate a
fraud. 33 Because the management of the various Panhandle entities decided
to distribute unequally the costs and benefits of acquiring casinghead gas
among the various corporations, thus shifting the costs to the plaintiffs but
22. Id. at 1133.
23. Id.
24. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Lucas v. Texas Indus., 696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1984)).
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., 730 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc);
Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968)).
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allowing Panhandle Eastern to reap all the benefits, the jury could reason-
ably conclude that, if their findings accorded distinct rights and corporate
separateness to the corporations, an inequitable result would follow. 34 Fi-
nally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that corporate disregard
could only be used offensively (such as where creditors or victims seek to
satisfy unpaid debts of a corporate defendant by finding a deeper pocket) and
concluded that the Castleberry court did not intend to so limit the applica-
tion of the sham to perpetrate a fraud theory. 35
Another corporate disregard case decided during the Survey period, Speed
v. Eluma International, Inc.,36 involved an award of exemplary damages
against the officers and sole shareholder of a corporation pursuant to the
jury's finding of constructive fraud.
Joe Speed, the sole shareholder, an officer, and a director of Josef Manu-
facturing, Inc. (Josef), owned the real property on which Josef's offices were
located. Thus, Joe also acted in the capacity of Josef's landlord. Keith
Speed, Joe's son, was also an officer and director of Josef. In October of
1984 Josef negotiated a bulk sale of its assets to Ft. Worth Avenue Manufac-
turing, Inc. (Ft. Worth) in exchange for $250,000, $150,000 of which Ft.
Worth would pay in the form of a two-year promissory note. When two of
Josef's general creditors, Eluma International, Inc. (Eluma) and Common-
wealth Metals Corporation (Commonwealth), discovered the proposed
transfer and obtained an order restraining the sale, Joe foreclosed his land-
lord's lien on the assets of Josef. Joe then held a private sale and sold the
assets to Ft. Worth at the price agreed upon in the aborted bulk sale transac-
tion. The trial court disregarded the corporate identity of Josef and entered
judgment against the Speeds in accordance with the jury's findings, which
were based on the sham to perpetrate a fraud and alter ego theories of corpo-
rate disregard set forth in Castleberry. The jury awarded Eluma and Com-
monwealth actual damages of $92,000 and $59,000, respectively, as well as
exemplary damages aggregating $160,000.
On appeal, the Speeds set forth two arguments. First, they argued that
they did not breach any legal duty that would give rise to a constructive
fraud action. Second, the Speeds claimed that the trial court should not
have disregarded the corporate entity because the plaintiffs produced insuffi-
cient evidence to support a finding of alter ego. In response to the Speeds'
first argument, the court stated that constructive fraud may also arise when
an equitable duty is violated. 37 The trial court submitted to the jury a spe-
cial issue asking whether the Speeds committed fraud. In its instruction, the
court defined fraud as "any act, omission, or concealment that involves a
breach of legal duty, trust, or confidence and that is injurious to or misleads
another person or by which an undue and unconscionable advantage is
taken."' 38 The court determined that, if the jury believed that the foreclosure
34. Id. at 1135.
35. Id.
36. 757 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ requested).
37. Id. at 797.
38. Id. at 796.
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of the landlord's lien represented a sham perpetrated in order to circumvent
the temporary restraining order, such a finding would support a claim of
constructive fraud and a corresponding judgment to disregard the corporate
fiction and hold the Speeds personally liable.39 In a loosely worded opinion,
however, the appellate court ultimately concluded that the jury need only
affirmatively answer the special constructive fraud issue to support a judg-
ment disregarding the corporate fiction 4° and that no special finding on
sham to perpetrate a fraud need be obtained.41
The appellate court next, and perhaps more importantly, reviewed the
award of exemplary damages. The jury found that the Speeds acted with
malice in breaching the equitable duty they owed to the plaintiffs. 42 Review-
ing the evidence, the court concluded that the jury could have believed that
the Speeds attempted to consummate the sale prohibited by the temporary
restraining order by creating a nonexistent back rent claim, and that the
Speeds committed such acts intentionally and without just cause or excuse. 43
Based upon this presumption, the court upheld an award of exemplary dam-
ages on a finding of corporate disregard in connection with the breach of an
equitable duty to general trade creditors. 44
In a Texas court of appeals case dealing with the alter ego doctrine, Gen-
sco, Inc. v. Canco Equipment, Inc.,4 1 Gensco, Inc. (Gensco) sued Canco
Equipment, Inc. (Canco) on a debt and attempted to pierce its corporate veil
and thereby recover from Canco's two shareholders, Nolan H. Brunson, III
and Jerry Fowler. Following the opinion of the Dallas Court of Appeals in
Branscum v. Castleberry,46 the trial court held that it was a matter of law
whether Canco constituted the alter ego of Brunson and Fowler. Based on
jury findings (i) that neither Brunson nor Fowler "primarily used the corpo-
rate form of Canco as a conduit for the conduct of their own personal busi-
ness,"'47 and (ii) that upon incorporation Canco did not have inadequate
capitalization, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that Gensco could
not prevail on its alter ego theory.
The court of appeals noted that the Texas Supreme Court, in its subse-
quent review of Branscum v. Castleberry, disapproved of the lower court's
method of submitting an alter ego case to the jury, endorsing instead a pro-
cedure whereby the court asks the jury the ultimate question, "[d]o you find
from a preponderance of the evidence that the corporation was the alter ego
of the individual?" 48 The Gensco court, interpreting Castleberry v. Brans-
cum, stated that for the jury to be able to answer this ultimate question,
39. Id. at 798.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 796.
42. Id. at 799. The court defined malice as "an unlawful action done intentionally with-
out just cause or excuse."
43. Id.
44. Id. at 800.
45. 737 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ).
46. 695 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985), rev'd, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
47. Gensco, 737 S.W.2d at 346.
48. Id. at 347.
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instructions must be given as to the different fact situations that may justify
a decision to disregard the corporate identity.49 The appellate court con-
eluded that the trial court incorrectly submitted the case to the jury, re-
versed the holding, and remanded the case for retrial.50
Another point illuminated by the Gensco court involved the estoppel the-
ory advanced by the shareholders, Brunson and Fowler. The court noted
that Texas courts have acknowledged that if the party acts with full knowl-
edge of the relationship between the corporation and the stockholder, he
may be estopped from attempting to disregard the corporate entity.51 The
court pointed out, however, that estoppel only arises if a party seeking to
disregard the corporate entity has all the "essential facts" relevant in a situa-
tion and nevertheless continues to do business with the corporation without
implementing any safeguards.52 Notwithstanding the fact that the jury
found Gensco had adequate opportunity to investigate the financial ability
and creditworthiness of Canco, and Gensco knew of Canco's corporate na-
ture and voluntarily did business with it, the court of appeals determined
that to establish a successful defense, Brunson and Fowler should have se-
cured a specific finding that Gensco in fact knew the "essential facts" of the
relationship between Canco, Brunson, and Fowler and continued to do busi-
ness with Canco despite that knowledge.5 3
The plaintiff in Hideca Petroleum Corp. v. Tampimex Oil International,
Ltd. 54 Tampimex, successfully applied the alter ego theory to its breach of
contract action. Robert Sessions, an employee of Tampimex (the seller), and
Vincente Scippa, an employee of Hideca Petroleum (the buyer), negotiated
by telex the sale of Dubai crude oil. The signature on all telexes read
"Vincente Scippa Hideca Petroleum Corp. on behalf of and as instructed
only by Hideca Trading, Inc." As a consequence of that evidence and, in
addition, the fact that Tampimex sent Hideca Petroleum a telex confirming
an oral agreement between Scippa and Tampimex naming Hideca Trading
as the buyer, the trial court found that both Hideca Trading and Hideca
Petroleum entered into a contract with Tampimex for the purchase of oil.
The Tudela brothers of Caracas, Venezuela, owned a majority of the stock in
the corporations that owned Hideca Petroleum, a Delaware corporation,
and Hideca Trading, a Cayman Islands corporation. Hideca Petroleum op-
erated in the domestic crude oil markets and had offices in Houston, Texas.
Hideca Trading operated in the international markets and had offices in Ca-
racas, Venezuela.
The Hideca entities alleged that Scippa worked only for Hideca Petroleum
and not Hideca Trading. Scippa learned of the opportunity for Hideca
Trading to sell 800,000 barrels of Dubai crude oil to Amerada Hess Com-
pany through I.T.I., a broker. Scippa began searching for a source from
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 348.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 740 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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which to obtain the crude and happened to contact Robert Sessions of
Tampimex. The transaction ultimately failed. Scippa, allegedly represent-
ing only Hideca Trading, could not acquire the required letters of credit
from I.T.I. At the same time, Scippa also found out that I.T.I. did not really
have a buyer for the Dubai crude oil. Sessions testified that, by that time,
the third party that was to provide the oil for resale to Hideca expected
Sessions to honor his commitment that Tampimex purchase the crude. The
trial court concluded that both Hideca Petroleum and Hideca Trading had
entered into and subsequently breached a contract with Tampimex. The
court also found that Scippa had agency authority to act for Hideca Petro-
leum and, in turn, that Hideca Petroleum had actual authority to act as an
agent for Hideca Trading.
On appeal, the Hideca companies argued that the trial court erred in rul-
ing that Hideca Petroleum represented the alter ego of Hideca Trading and,
therefore, was liable to Tampimex. The court of appeals reviewed the fac-
tors generally necessary for applying the doctrine of alter ego as set forth in
Castleberry. The court concluded that the rationale for the doctrine follows
from one presumption: "[i]f the shareholders themselves, or the corpora-
tions disregard themselves, the legal separation, distinct properties, or
proper formalities of the different corporate enterprises, then the law will
likewise disregard them so far as is necessary to protect individual and cor-
porate creditors."'55 In reviewing the facts of the case, the court noted that
the Hideca entities presented no evidence that Hideca Petroleum ever actu-
ally informed Tampimex of Hideca Petroleum's alleged role as agent for
Hideca Trading or ever received any directions or instructions from Hideca
Trading regarding the proposed Dubai crude transactions. 56 Consequently,
the court stated that because the corporations themselves made no identifi-
able effort to separate the two entities, as evidenced by the foregoing facts,
the law should not view them separately, but instead as one enterprise. 57 In
light of the above and other testimony to the effect that, in the petroleum
business, corporations often use various forms of a corporate name in refer-
ring to the same company, and Hideca Petroleum told Tampimex that
Hideca Trading used the same Houston address as Hideca Petroleum, never
hinting that two separate corporate entities might exist, the court reaffirmed
the "single business enterprise" theory of the alter ego doctrine. 58 The court
defined the single business enterprise theory as follows: "[w]hen corpora-
tions are not operated as separate entities, but rather integrate their re-
sources to achieve a common business purpose, each constituent corporation
may be held liable for the debts incurred by the other component entities in
pursuit of that business purpose." 59 Given the compelling facts of the
Hideca case, one can easily understand the court of appeals' reasoning. Nev-
ertheless, the maintenance of corporate formalities, the existence or nonexis-
55. Id. at 843.
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tence of which may not be known by a third party, should not be a factor in
applying the alter ego doctrine in a contract-based corporate disregard case.
To do so would allow contract-based claimants a windfall.
In Gallagher v. Bintliff 6 the court of appeals held that when a plaintiff
sues the shareholders of a corporation on a theory of corporate disregard,
the event that commences the running of the statute of limitations on the
underlying cause of action against the corporation also commences the run-
ning of the statute of limitations with respect to the claim against the corpo-
ration's shareholders. 61 The court based its holding on the principle that the
assertion by a plaintiff of a theory of corporate disregard is not, in and of
itself, a cause of action, but rather a means of imposing liability upon the
responsible party for a tort or breach of contract cause of action. 62
In February 1982 Sabrina Gallagher worked at the Sea Gun Sports Inn,
Inc. (Sea Gun) as a waitress, during which time she suffered a work-related
injury. Gallagher filed a tort claim against the corporation, citing Sea Gun's
failure to maintain a safe workplace, and a contract claim, alleging breach of
contract as a result of Sea Gun's failure to maintain workers' compensation
insurance. The jury awarded Gallagher a judgment in the amount of
$414,000.
On June 19, 1986, Gallagher instituted a collection proceeding 63 against
McClure Bintliff and others as the shareholders of Sea Gun, asserting their
personal liability on the judgment under the alter ego doctrine. Bintliff
moved for summary judgment, alleging estoppel, res judicata, and the stat-
ute of limitations. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment on the basis that the statute of limitations barred Gal-
lagher's claim. 64 Bintliff's evidence showed the following sequence of
events: February 1982, Gallagher sustained her injury; October 1982, Gal-
lagher filed suit against Sea Gun; November 1983, the district court entered
a judgment in favor of Gallagher; and June 1986, Gallagher filed a collection
suit. In response, Gallagher pointed out that sections 16.001 and 16.051 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code state the limitation period to
collect a judgment is not less than four years. 65 Gallagher also argued that,
under the statute, the cause of action accrued on the date of the entry of
judgment, November 14, 1983. Citing Gulf Reduction Corp. v. Boyles Galva-
nizing & Plating Co. ,66 the court of appeals found that the determination as
to which statute of limitations should apply depends upon the basic sub-
stance of the pleadings rather than the form of the cause of action.67
Although Gallagher brought suit against Bintliff pursuant to a collections
statute, she wanted the court to base the liability of Sea Gun's shareholders
60. 740 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
61. Id. at 119.
62. Id.
63. Gallagher brought the collection proceeding pursuant to TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon 1986).
64. Gallagher, 740 S.W.2d at 119.
65. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.001, 16.051 (Vernon 1986).
66. 456 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970, no writ).
67. Gallagher, 740 S.W.2d at 119-20.
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on a theory of alter ego.68 The court noted that an attempt to disregard a
corporate entity does not constitute a separate cause of action; thus, the
cause of action pleaded by Gallagher could only be the underlying tort claim
relating to failure to keep a safe workplace or the breach of contract action.69
Accordingly, the applicable period of limitations would run for two years,
under the tort cause of action, or four years, under the contract cause of
action, but, in either case, the cause of action that would commence the
running of the limitations period accrued when Gallagher sustained her
injury.70
2. Fiduciary Duties of Officers, Directors, and Shareholders
The Dallas court of appeals case, Kaspar v. Thorne,71 addresses the ques-
tion whether shareholders in a close corporation owe a fiduciary duty to
each other. In Kaspar Lansing Thorne, a fifty percent shareholder of F.F.P.,
Inc. (F.F.P.), sued Henry Kaspar, the other fifty percent shareholder of
F.F.P. F.F.P., a corporation engaged primarily in the business of real estate
development, purchased several lots on which it constructed six houses and
arranged for Mercantile Bank (Mercantile) to provide financing for such
construction. Kaspar testified that, because Mercantile wanted F.F.P. to de-
crease its indebtedness, Kaspar and Thorne each purchased one of the
homes so that the purchase money could be used by F.F.P. to repay the
indebtedness owed Mercantile. Kaspar executed a promissory note in favor
of F.F.P. for $32,000, which contained a provision stating "[t]his note is to
become null and void upon payment in full of all indebtedness owed to Mer-
cantile ... by F.F.P.' '72 Thorne testified that he did not know about this
language until after the execution of the note. Kaspar, on the other hand,
testified that he and Thorne had an understanding that he purchased the
home only to accommodate the bank's request. Thorne brought suit because
(i) he felt Kaspar should be held liable under the promissory note issued to
F.F.P. and wanted a declaratory judgment so stating, (ii) he wanted mone-
tary damages for Kaspar's breach of a fiduciary duty owed him, and (iii) he
wanted the court to appoint a receiver with the authority to dissolve F.F.P.
The trial court granted both the declaratory judgment and money damages
and appointed Thorne as receiver to liquidate F.F.P. The court of appeals,
however, reversed, holding that Thorne, as an individual shareholder, had
no right to sue to enforce a corporate obligation. 73 The court of appeals also
held that, because the question whether one shareholder owes a fiduciary
duty to another usually constitutes a question of fact, the trial court erred in
failing to submit that question to the jury. 74
On review, the court of appeals first noted that article 7.06(A) of the
68. Id. at 119.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 755 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
72. Id. at 153.
73. Id. at 155.
74. Id. at 156.
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Texas Business Corporation Act (the TBCA), 75 when read in conjunction
with article 6.04(A)(4) of the TBCA,76 requires that a corporation make an
affirmative decision to dissolve as a condition precedent to the appointment
of a receiver pursuant to article 7.06(A).77 Because, in this case, dissolution
had not been authorized by unanimous written consent of the shareholders78
or by a resolution of the board of directors and the affirmative vote of the
holders of two-thirds of the corporation's outstanding shares, 79 the court
held that under article 7.06 the trial court did not have authority to appoint
a receiver to liquidate F.F.P.80
The court then addressed Thorne's right to seek a declaration that
F.F.P.'s note was enforceable against Kaspar. The court concluded that
Thorne had no right to seek a declaration of the corporation's rights as an
individual, but only as a representative of F.F.P.81 Thorne did not bring suit
as a representative of the corporation and, therefore, had no legal right to
seek a declaratory judgment.82 The court also noted that an individual
shareholder has no private cause of action for personal damages caused
solely by a wrong to the corporation, nor may an individual shareholder sue
to enforce a corporate obligation.83 The only method by which an individual
shareholder may sue to enforce a corporate obligation is by way of a deriva-
tive action.84 In a derivative action, the shareholder's pleading must state
with particularity the effort made by the shareholder to encourage the board
of directors to bring suit on behalf of the corporation.8 5 Finding that
Thorne made no such allegation, the court concluded that he had no right to
seek a declaratory judgment establishing F.F.P.'s rights under the note.86
The court in Kaspar then addressed whether Kaspar was liable to Thorne,
rather than to F.F.P. itself, for any breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court
had submitted a special issue to the jury whether Kaspar had breached his
fiduciary duty to Thorne, and the jury found that he had. The jury, how-
ever, did not receive a question whether Kaspar owed a fiduciary duty to
Thorne. Instead, the trial court instructed that Thorne and Kaspar had a
75. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 7.06(A) (Vernon 1988).
76. Id. art. 6.04(A)(4).
77. Kaspar, 755 S.W.2d at 153.
78. Article 6.02 of the TBCA provides that "[a] corporation may be voluntarily dissolved
by the written consent of all of its shareholders." TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 6.02
(Vernon 1988).
79. Id.
80. Kaspar, 755 S.W.2d at 153-54.
81. Id. The court also noted that even ifThorne were president of the corporation, absent
a specific provision in the bylaws allowing the president to bring or defend litigation on behalf
of the corporation or a special board resolution regarding such action, Thorne would still be
unable to seek a declaratory judgment on behalf of the corporation. Id. Thorne neither al-




85. In light of Eye Site, Inc. v. Blackburn, 750 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988), which was decided by the court of appeals in Houston six weeks earlier than
Kaspar, Thorne presumably would not have been able to bring such a derivative action. See
discussion infra at notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
86. Kaspar, 755 S.W.2d at 155.
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fiduciary relationship as a matter of law. The court of appeals then reiter-
ated a principle set forth in its decision in Schoellkopf v. Pledger.87 There the
court specifically repudiated the principle that shareholders in a closely held
corporation owed an implied duty of good faith to each other as a matter of
law.8 8 Whether a fiduciary relationship may exist in a particular fact situa-
tion presents a question of fact for the jury.8 9 In light of the erroneous jury
instructions, the Kaspar court reversed the decision of the trial court because
the verdict would not support a recovery for Thorne.90
In Davis v. Sheerin9 1 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order
that a majority shareholder purchase a minority shareholder's interest in a
corporation, thus approving an ordered buy-out as an appropriate remedy
for a jury's findings of breach of fiduciary duty and oppressive conduct by a
majority shareholder. 92 In 1955, William H. Davis and James L. Sheerin
incorporated a business. Davis owned fifty-five percent of the corporation's
outstanding capital stock and Sheerin owned the remaining forty-five per-
cent. While both men served as directors and officers, Davis served as the
corporation's president and managed the day-to-day operations of the busi-
ness; Sherin was not an employee of the corporation. In 1960, Sheerin and
Davis formed a partnership for the purpose of acquiring real estate.
In 1985, Davis and his wife, Catherine, a named defendant in the suit,
denied Sheerin his right to inspect the corporate books unless he presented a
stock certificate evidencing his ownership in the company. Sheerin brought
suit against the Davises claiming breach of fiduciary duty and oppressive
conduct by the Davises as majority shareholders. The Davises alleged that,
in the late 1960s, Sheerin gave them his forty-five percent interest in the
corporation's stock. The Davises also alleged that Sheerin had no interest in
the partnership's property, namely a forty-five percent interest in certain
tracts of land. To further their argument, the Davises claimed that, because
Mr. Davis purchased the first tract of land before the formation of the part-
nership and because the Davises appeared as the grantees in each of the
deeds, the properties did not constitute partnership assets.
Based upon the jury's finding that the Davises had conspired to deprive
Sheerin of his stock and the trial court's conclusion that, as a matter of law,
the Davises acted oppressively against Sheerin, the trial court declared that
Sheerin owned a forty-five percent interest in the corporation, the partner-
ship, and the tracts of land. The trial court ordered, among other things,
that: (i) the Davises purchase Sheerin's stock in the corporation for the
stock's fair value as determined by the jury; (ii) an injunction issue prohibit-
ing the Davises from contributing to a profit-sharing plan for their benefit
unless Sheerin received a proportionate sum; (iii) the Davises pay damages
in the amount of $21,000 as compensation for their willful breach of fiduci-
87. 739 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987), rev'd, 762 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1988).
88. Kaspar, 755 S.W.2d at 155.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 155-56.
91. 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
92. Id. at 381.
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ary duty by making contributions to such profit-sharing plan to the exclu-
sion of Sheerin; and (iv) a receiver be appointed for the corporation. The
Davises presented a two-fold argument on appeal. First, they claimed that
under Texas law a court-ordered purchase of a minority shareholder's inter-
est is not an available remedy for a minority shareholder. Second, the
Davises argued that even if minority shareholders could obtain such a rem-
edy, the specific facts of this case did not support the jury's findings or the
court's determination of oppressive conduct.
The court of appeals first noted that the TBCA93 does not specifically
grant an aggrieved minority shareholder a buy-out remedy, but does provide
for the appointment of a receiver in certain instances, including situations of
illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct by majority shareholders or those
in control.94 Further, the court was unable to find any support in Texas case
law for ordering a buy-out remedy absent a specific provision in the contract
between the parties.95 The court ultimately based its holding upon the deci-
sion in Patton v. Nicholas,96 which stated that Texas courts, in the absence of
statutory authority, may order liquidation under their general equity pow-
ers.97 The Davis court held that courts may order less harsh remedies under
those same equity powers, and that a buy-out may be decreed in appropriate
cases if any less harsh remedy would be inadequate to protect the rights of
the parties.98
The court then questioned whether an ordered buy-out was an appropri-
ate remedy for Sheerin in his action against the Davises. The court found,
after reviewing several cases from other jurisdictions, that oppressive con-
duct was the most common violation for which other courts found a buy-out
to be an appropriate remedy. 99 The court of appeals pointed out that
although the TBCA authorizes a cause of action based on oppressive con-
duct,1°° neither the TBCA nor any Texas court has specified what consti-
tutes "oppressive conduct."''1 The court cited a New York case that found
that oppressive conduct occurs only when a minority shareholder's expecta-
tions, objectively viewed as reasonable and important in the minority share-
holder's decision to invest in the business, ultimately failed to materialize
solely because of the majority shareholder's oppressive conduct.' 0 2 Relying
upon the definition of "oppressive conduct" set by the New York court, the
court held that whether a majority shareholder's acts constitute oppressive
conduct usually presents a question of law for the court, 10 3 and that the
evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the Davises engaged in
93. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.05 (Vernon 1986).
94. Davis, 754 S.W.2d at 378.
95. See id.
96. 154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.2d 848 (1955).
97. Davis, 754 S.W.2d at 379 (citing Patton v. Nicholas).
98. Id. at 379.
99. Id. at 379-81.
100. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.05 (Vernon 1988).
101. Davis, 754 S.W.2d at 381.





oppressive conduct and would have likely continued to do so in the fu-
ture. 104 The court specifically mentioned the jury's findings of conspiracy to
deprive Sheerin of his interest in the business, willful breach of fiduciary
duty, and the probability that Sheerin would be denied any future voice in
the corporation. 10 5
Finally, the Davis court reviewed the question whether a less harsh rem-
edy than an ordered buy-out could adequately protect Sheerin's interest.
The court noted that decisions of courts in states with statutes that contain
provisions similar to article 7.05 of the TBCA have held that an action for
oppressive conduct affords an independent ground for relief that does not
require a showing of fraud, illegality, mismanagement, wasting of assets, or
deadlock. 10 6 The court concluded that the Davises' oppressive conduct in
attempting to acquire Sheerin's stock indicated their desire to gain total con-
trol of the business and that a judgment consisting merely of certain injunc-
tions against the Davises and an award of damages would be inadequate to
fully protect Sheerin's rights and interest in the corporation. 10 7 The court
held that given the facts of the case, an ordered buy-out represented the only
appropriate remedy. 10s
3. Derivative Actions
In Eye Site, Inc. v. Blackburn '09 a Texas court of appeals reviewed a
shareholder's ability to maintain a derivative action in a situation where no
other shareholders are "similarly situated." In Eye Site Joseph Blackburn
and Stephen Smolins, licensed optometrists, developed a new method for
servicing their patients in a retail optical store. To test the concept, Black-
burn and Smolins formed a limited partnership and opened one store.
Blackburn, Smolins, and Orville Cox (who had become involved in the busi-
ness by raising money for the store) then formed a Texas corporation, Eye
Site, Inc., and Cox received twenty-five percent of the shares of common
stock. Subsequently, Blackburn and Smolins had a falling out with Cox and
formed a new entity, Eye Optics, Inc., for the purpose of raising funds for
future stores.
The Gillette Company, interested in the Eye Optics concept, made a loan
of $36,000,000 to Eye Optics and also purchased forty percent of the shares
of Eye Optics common stock. Shortly thereafter, Cox filed a shareholders'
derivative suit on behalf of Eye Site accusing Blackburn and Smolins of di-
verting corporate opportunities properly belonging to Eye Site to Eye Op-
tics. When it later became obvious that Eye Optics would be unable to meet
its debt obligation, Gillette offered to purchase the remainder of the out-
104. Id. at 383.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 381-82 (referring to Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976) (citing Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131, 135
(1960)).
107. Id. at 383.
108. Id.
109. 750 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
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standing stock. Cox promptly filed a temporary restraining order on behalf
of Eye Site to enjoin the sale of the stock or the company assets. At the
temporary injunction hearing, the defendants challenged Cox's legal stand-
ing to bring a derivative action on behalf of Eye Site, and the court dismissed
the lawsuit.
On appeal, Cox argued two points of error. First, Cox claimed the trial
court should not have dismissed the derivative suit since no other share-
holder existed who was willing to enforce the corporation's rights against the
remaining shareholders, Blackburn and Smolins. Second, Cox alleged that
the trial court mistakenly dismissed the case based on its determination that
one shareholder lacked standing to sue under article 5.14 of the TBCA 110
and that Cox failed to comply with rule 42(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure governing derivative actions.111 Rule 42(a) essentially provides
that a derivative suit may only be maintained if the plaintiff "fairly and ade-
quately" represents the interests of the other shareholders "similarly situ-
ated" in enforcing the rights of the corporation. 112
The appellate court addressed the single issue whether one minority share-
holder, opposed by all other shareholders, could fairly and adequately repre-
sent the interests of other similarly situated shareholders. Although no
Texas court had specifically ruled on this issue, the court pointed out that
rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' 1 3 represented the deriva-
110. Article 5.14 of the TBCA provides:
A derivative suit may be brought in this State only if: (1) The plaintiff was a
record or beneficial owner of shares, or of an interest in a voting trust for shares,
at the time of the transaction of which he complains, or his shares or interest
thereafter devolved upon him by operation of law from a person who was such
an owner at that time ....
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14 (Vernon 1988).
111. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law, or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representa-
tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Derivative Suit. In a derivative suit brought pursuant to Article 5.14 of the
Texas Business Corporation Act, the petition shall contain the allegations
(1) that the plaintiff was a record or beneficial owner of shares, or of an interest
in a voting trust for shares at the time of the transaction of which he complains,
or his shares or interest thereafter devolved upon him by operation of law from a
person who was the owner at that time, and (2) with particularity, the efforts of
the plaintiff to have suit brought for the corporation by the board of directors, or
the reasons for not making any such efforts. The derivative suit may not be
maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately repre-
sent the interests of the shareholders similarly situated in enforcing the right of
the corporation. The suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court, and notice in the manner directed by the court of the
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders.
112. Id.; Eye Site, 750 S.W.2d at 276.
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 states:
Derivative Actions by Shareholders. In a derivative action brought by one or
more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unin-
corporated association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a
right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and
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tive source of rule 42(a) and that federal courts had steadfastly dismissed
derivative suits arising under comparable circumstances.1 14 The court of ap-
peals concluded that a single shareholder cannot satisfy the requirements of
rule 42(a) and maintain a derivative action for a corporation when all re-
maining shareholders stand opposed. 15
Eye Site represents the first Texas case to construe the rule 42(a) prerequi-
site that a shareholder plaintiff in a derivative action must "fairly and ade-
quately represent the interests of the shareholders similarly situated." The
court, however, did not address the full scope of this requirement. The court
failed to consider how many plaintiff shareholders in a derivative suit would
satisfy the requirement of rule 42(a). In addition, the court did not define
how close the "interests" of the plaintiff shareholder must be to the interests
of other shareholders "similarly situated." The court has now opened the
door for litigants to raise these issues in future derivative actions.
4. Golden Parachute Provisions
In Sealock v. Texas Federal Savings & Loan Association 116 the Texas
Supreme Court held that a corporate reorganization, effected by a reverse
triangular merger, that resulted in an employer's stock being exchanged for
the stock of a newly formed holding company triggered the golden para-
chute provisions of an employment contract." 7
Glenn Sealock and Texas Federal Savings & Loan Association (Texas
Federal) entered into an employment contract that contained an ambiguous
golden parachute provision purporting to guarantee Sealock certain sever-
ance benefits if he were fired after a specified change in corporate ownership
or control. The vesting of ownership of ten percent or more of the outstand-
ing voting securities of Texas Federal in any person or group of persons
acting in concert triggered the golden parachute. Texas Federal subse-
quently formed a holding company, Texas Federal Financial Corporation
(Texas Federal Financial), as a Delaware corporation, and a second savings
and loan association, New Texas Federal Savings and Loan Association
shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the
transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the plaintiff's share or mem-
bership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of law, and (2) that the
action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States
which it would not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with partic-
ularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff
desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the
shareholders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort. The derivative action may not be main-
tained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right
of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compro-
mised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the
court directs.
114. Eye Site, 750 S.W.2d at 276.
115. Id.
116. 755 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1988).
117. Id. at 71.
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(New Texas), as a wholly owned subsidiary of Texas Federal Financial.
Texas Federal then merged with and into New Texas and, by way of the
reverse triangular merger, became a wholly owned subsidiary of Texas Fed-
eral Financial. The merger agreement provided that the outstanding shares
of Texas Federal be exchanged for shares of Texas Federal Financial stock
on a one-for-one basis. The liabilities, assets, directors, and officers, even the
articles of incorporation and the bylaws of Texas Federal, remained as part
of New Texas. The sole purpose of the merger was to establish a Delaware
savings and loan holding company for Texas Federal. Texas Federal fired
Sealock eleven days after the merger. Sealock then filed a breach of contract
action when Texas Federal refused to pay his severance benefits. The trial
court, finding as a matter of law that the reverse triangular merger triggered
the golden parachute provision, awarded Sealock monetary damages in the
amount of $790,000.
The court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment
against Sealock. 18 The appeals court stated that because the Texas Federal
stock "disappeared" as a result of the merger, such stock never vested in any
other person or entity as required by the employment contract's golden para-
chute provision." 9 The court held that no breach of contract occurred be-
cause the golden parachute provision never came into effect.' 20
The Texas Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing golden para-
chute provisions and noted that they are generally designed to protect key
executives in the event of a change in control or ownership of a company. 121
Surprisingly, the supreme court then rejected Texas Federal's contention
that no change in ownership occurred, even though all of the owners of
Texas Federal stock were also owners of Texas Federal Financial stock,
which, in turn, owned all of the stock of New Texas. The court held that the
terms of this particular golden parachute provision would be satisfied if the
Texas Federal stock became vested "in any person or group of persons act-
ing in concert."'' 22
5. Survival of Actions Upon Dissolution
The Austin Court of Appeals, in Reveille Tool & Supply, Inc. v. State,123
reviewed article 7.12 of the TBCA prior to the 1987 amendments. 24 For-
mer article 7.12 provided:
The dissolution of a corporation ... shall not take away or impair any
remedy available to or against such corporation . . . for any right or
claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if ac-
tion or other proceeding thereon is commenced within three years after
118. Texas Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Sealock, 737 S.W.2d 870, 877 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987),
rev'd, 755 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1988).
119. 737 S.W.2d at 875.
120. Id.
121. Sealock, 755 S.W.2d at 70-71.
122. Id. at 71 (emphasis by the court).
123. 756 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
124. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.12 (Vernon 1986).
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the date of such dissolution.1 25
In Reveille, the State of Texas, certain municipalities, and the Houston Met-
ropolitan Rapid Transit Authority sued Reveille Tool & Supply, Inc.
(Reveille) to recover taxes and penalties pursuant to various tax statutes.
The Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts delivered a "Notice of Jeopardy
Determination" for sales tax liability against Reveille in November 1982.
Reveille promptly requested a redetermination of the tax deficiency calcula-
tion. One month later, Reveille filed articles of dissolution. In late 1984, the
Comptroller modified the original determination; the modifying order be-
came final on September 5, 1984, with the deficiency tax ordered due and
payable twenty days later. Because Reveille failed to pay the deficiency, on
January 31, 1986, more than three years following Reveille's filing of its arti-
cles of dissolution, the state filed suit to recover the tax due.
Reveille argued to the trial court that because the state filed suit more
than three years after the date of dissolution, TBCA article 7.12 barred the
suit. The state, referring to the exact language of the statute, claimed that
the phrase "action or other proceeding" includes an administrative proceed-
ing, such as a request for redetermination.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment and concluded
that the phrase "action or other proceeding" should be broadly interpreted
to illustrate that more than one method exists for claiming corporate liability
that will survive dissolution. 1 26 The court noted that the phrase "action or
other proceeding" clearly includes administrative proceedings and does not
require that liability be asserted by a lawsuit to a court. 127 Although the
court's language in Reveille seems to imply that its decision might have been
different had the current article 7.12 been in effect, given the substantially
similar language of amended article 7.12, there is no reason to conclude that
the court would have reached a different result had the current version of
article 7.12 been in effect at the time of dissolution.1 28
125. Id.
126. Id.; Reveille, 756 S.W.2d at 103.
127. Reveille, 756 S.W.2d at 103.
128. Amended article 7.12 now reads, in relevant part, as follows:
A. A corporation dissolved (1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution
or other action by the Secretary of State, (2) by a decree of a court when the
court has not liquidated all the assets and business of the corporation as pro-
vided in this Act, or (3) by expiration of its period of duration, shall continue its
corporate existence for a period of three (3) years from the date of dissolution,
for the following purposes:
(2) permitting the survival of any remedy not otherwise barred by limita-
tions available to or against the corporation, its officers, directors, shareholders,
or creditors, for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, before the
dissolution;
C. If after the expiration of the three-year period there still remains un-
resolved any action or proceeding not otherwise barred by limitations begun by
or against the corporation before its dissolution or within three (3) years after the
date of its dissolution, the corporation shall continue to survive only for the pur-
pose of that action or proceeding, until any judgment, order, or decree, in the
action or proceeding is fully executed.
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6 Failure to Disclose Acquisition Negotiations to Shareholders
In Voskamp v. Arnoldy 129 minority shareholders of a closely held corpora-
tion successfully brought an action against the chairman and an officer of the
corporation for fraud in connection with the corporation's purchase of their
shares. At trial the jury found that the chairman and executive vice presi-
dent had misrepresented and failed to disclose material facts concerning the
corporation to the minority shareholders who, in reliance thereon, sold their
shares back to the corporation and suffered damages in the amount of ap-
proximately $150 per share. On motion by the corporation and its officers,
the trial court granted the corporation and its officers judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. The plaintiff shareholders appealed. The court of ap-
peals reversed, holding that sufficient evidence existed to support a finding of
common law fraud and that the rule that preliminary merger discussions
need not be disclosed in connection with the purchase or sale of a corpora-
tion's securities did not apply to negotiations to sell the corporation's
assets. 130
The parties in Voskamp included: Roman Arnoldy, the majority share-
holder, president, and chairman of Tapco International (Tapco); his son,
John Arnoldy, the executive vice president, a director, and a shareholder of
Tapco; and Peter Voskamp, C.W. Bair, and Jerry Amussen, employees and
part of the management of Tapco. In 1972, Roman persuaded Voskamp and
Bair to purchase all of the shares of Tapco stock then held by a retiring
Tapco officer. Then, in 1977, after a significant increase in Tapco's sales,
Roman allegedly demanded that Voskamp and Bair sell a large portion of
that stock to him at the same price per share they paid in 1972. Bair sold
Roman approximately 425 shares, but Voskamp refused to comply with Ro-
man's demand. After Bair's sale, Voskamp and Bair together owned 6,000
of the 33,000 outstanding shares and Jerry Amussen owned 445 shares.
Tapco terminated all three employees between early 1978 and early 1979.
In late 1978, the Arnoldys hired a business broker to help them find a
potential buyer for either Tapco or one of its divisions. The broker arranged
a meeting with General Signal in December of 1978. At some point thereaf-
ter, but prior to April 1979, General Signal offered to purchase Tapco's
valve division. The Arnoldys rejected this offer, but never disclosed either
the meeting or the offer to Voskamp, Bair, or Amussen. Voskamp and Bair
filed separate suits in early 1979 against Roman alleging, on behalf of Tapco
shareholders, that Roman had mismanaged the corporation's affairs, ne-
glected to arrange promised pension benefits, and inflated his salary so as to
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.12 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
The implication of these provisions is that (i) a pre-dissolution claim against a dissolved
corporation will continue to abate after the expiration of three years following the dissolution
unless the claimant brings an action or other proceeding on the claim within the three-year
period of survival and (ii) post-dissolution claims against a dissolved corporation (i.e., claims
arising after the dissolution) will continue to be barred by art. 7.12. See Hunter v. Fort Worth
Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1981) (construing art. 7.12 prior to its amendment in
1987).
129. 749 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ denied).
130. Id. at 119-20.
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unduly enrich himself. Allegedly, Voskamp and Bair filed the suits to coerce
Tapco into buying back their stock. Between February 1978 and April 1979,
Voskamp and Bair's attorney met with Arnoldy to determine the value of
their stock. Voskamp, Bair, and Arnoldy negotiated a settlement that pro-
vided for Tapco to purchase Bair's and Voskamp's stock at a price of $100
per share. At no time during the pending suits or the settlement negotiations
did the Arnoldys disclose that they intended to sell a portion of Tapco. Vos-
kamp and Bair neither knew that a prospective buyer had been located nor
that an offer to buy Tapco had been made. Voskamp, Bair, and Amussen all
sold their stock back to Tapco at $100 per share, completely unaware of the
corporation's negotiations with General Signal.
The final agreement between General Signal and Tapco, signed in Novem-
ber 1980, provided for a purchase price of $8.8 million for Tapco's valve
division. Approximately eighteen months later, Voskamp, Bair, and Amus-
sen filed suit against the Arnoldys and Tapco claiming common law fraud,
stock fraud under section 27.01 of the Texas Business & Commerce Code, '31
and breach of fiduciary duty. The jury found in favor of Voskamp, Bair, and
Amussen and awarded them actual and punitive damages, but the trial court
granted judgment for the defendants notwithstanding the verdict.
In an effort to convince the court of appeals to uphold the trial court's
judgment, the Arnoldys argued that they had no duty to communicate to
any of the other shareholders their "preliminary discussions" with General
Signal and that "all official knowledge" had been disclosed. In support of
their argument, they cited Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc. 132 and Staffin v.
Greenberg,133 which discussed the duties imposed on officers of a corpora-
tion under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Both of these courts held
that inquiries, preliminary discussions, or other communications prepara-
tory to a possible acquisition of one company by another do not mandate
disclosure. 134 The court, however, found the principle of Greenfield and
Staffin inapplicable to the instant case and reversed the trial court by making
a puzzling distinction; the court simply stated that Tapco's situation in-
volved negotiations regarding the sale of assets, while Greenfield and Staffin
dealt with merger negotiations. 135 The existence or nonexistence of a duty
to disclose pending negotiations that may lead to a transaction that would
materially affect per share values should not turn on the structure of the
transaction.
The Arnoldys and Tapco further argued that insufficient evidence existed
to support the excessive jury award of punitive damages, which were such as
would force Tapco into bankruptcy. The appellate court noted that the
131. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1987).
132. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984).
133. 509 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982).
134. Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 756; Staffin, 509 F. Supp. at 826; see also Voskamp, 749
S.W.2d at 119 (discussing the Greenfield and Staffin holdings). Query whether the court's
holding with respect to this matter would have been the same had the court had the opportu-
nity to review Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988). See infra discussion at notes 180-
208 and accompanying text.
135. Voskamp, 749 S.W.2d at 119.
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amount of punitive damages turns upon the unique facts of each case and
rests largely within the discretion of the jury. 13 6 Given that the largest ratio
between punitive damages and actual damages awarded to Voskamp, Bair,
or Amussen equalled six to one, and considering the Arnoldys' purposeful
concealment of material information that was intended to induce Voskamp,
Bair, and Amussen to sell their shares at less than fair value, the court of
appeals concluded that the jury's award of punitive damages was reason-
able.137 The court dismissed the Arnoldys' contention that the business
judgment rule justified their actions.138 The court noted that the business
judgment rule may not be employed as a defense to suits alleging fraud. 139
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the Arnoldys' argument that Vos-
kamp, Bair, and Amussen knowingly and intelligently waived any right to
later demand a higher price for their stock when they sold it pursuant to a
prior settlement. 14 Waiver, noted the court, constitutes an intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, "but fraud vitiates
whatever it touches and cannot be waived."' 4'
7. Noncompetition Agreements and Conflicts of Law and the Texas Free
Enterprise and Antitrust Act
In 1987 the Texas Supreme Court severely restricted the use of noncompe-
tition agreements when, in Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc. 142 and Bergman v.
Norris of Houston,143 the court reformulated the criteria to be applied in
determining whether such agreements are enforceable. In those cases, the
court held unenforceable convenants designed to limit competition or re-
strain the right to engage in a "common calling." In July 1988 the Texas
Supreme Court dealt another blow to the enforceability of noncompetition
agreements. In DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corporation '44 the court held that
Texas' interest in promoting the free movement of workers in the job market
constitutes a fundamental public policy so that Texas courts will not honor
an otherwise valid choice of foreign law to govern a noncompetition agree-
ment if the chosen state's law would enforce the noncompetition agreement
and Texas law would not.' 45
Edward DeSantis worked as the area manager for Wackenhut Corpora-
tion (Wackenhut) in its Houston office. In connection with his employment,
DeSantis negotiated and entered into a noncompetition agreement while at
Wackenhut's corporate headquarters in Florida. Wackenhut specialized in
furnishing various business enterprises with security personnel. Having pre-




140. Id. at 124.
141. Id. (citing Stonecipher v. Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex. 1979)).
142. 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987).
143. 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987).
144. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 616 (July 13, 1988). The Texas Supreme Court has granted a
request for rehearing.
145. Id. at 620.
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viously been employed by the United States' Central Intelligence Agency
and in the private sector, DeSantis had several years of experience in the
security area. After three years, DeSantis resigned from Wackenhut under
threat of termination and formed a new company, Risk Deterrence, Inc.
(RDI). RDI provided security consulting and guard services to a limited
clientele, including certain former clients of Wackenhut. Wackenhut sued
DeSantis and RDI for breach of the noncompetition agreement and sought
injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. The trial court enjoined De-
Santis from competing with Wackenhut for two years in a thirteen-county
area and from releasing client lists or revealing confidential information.
The court also enjoined RDI from ever divulging or using any confidential
or proprietary information acquired through DeSantis by reason of his em-
ployment with Wackenhut. Both the trial court and the court of appeals
honored the choice of law specified in the agreement, stating that Florida
law should govern all questions concerning interpretation or enforcement of
the contract. On appeal, DeSantis argued that the lower courts erred by
giving effect to the Florida choice of law provisions because Florida law on
covenants not to compete contradicted Texas fundamental public policy.
The Texas Supreme Court first analyzed the Texas contractual choice of
law rule, stated by the court in First Commerce Realty Investors v. K-FLand
Co. 146 that "an express agreement among the parties that a contract is to be
governed by the laws of a particular state will be given effect if the contract
bears a reasonable relation to the chosen state and no countervailing public
policy of the forum demands otherwise."' 147 The supreme court, acknowl-
edging the need for certainty and predictability in multi-state contract trans-
actions, expressly adopted section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws. 14 8 This provision states that a contractual choice of for-
eign law will be enforced if (i) a reasonable relationship exists between the
parties and the jurisdiction whose law is chosen and (ii) the chosen law is not
contrary to a fundamental public policy of the forum state.149
In applying the Restatement rule to the choice of Florida law in the
Wackenhut noncompetition agreement, the Texas Supreme Court noted that
Wackenhut's Florida corporate offices were the place in which Wackenhut
interviewed and hired DeSantis and that persons from the Florida headquar-
ters closely supervised the management of the Houston office.15 0 The court
thus found a reasonable relationship between the parties and the State of
Florida. 15 1 The court also found, however, that the law of Florida differed
dramatically from Texas law in the area of covenants not to compete, so that
the application of Florida law would adversely affect personal rights created
in support of a fundamental policy of the State of Texas.' 5 2 The court noted
146. 617 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
147. DeSantis, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 618 (citing First Commerce Realty Investors, 617
S.W.2d at 808-09).
148. Id.
149. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1969).
150. DeSantis, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 618.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 618-20.
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that a Florida statute mandated the enforceability of covenants not to com-
pete, 1 3 and that Florida courts had freely granted injunctive relief for
breach of noncompetition agreements by recognizing a presumption of irrep-
arable harm to the promisee.154 Finally, as the court noted, Florida had no
counterpart to Texas' restriction in areas of "common calling," but rather
had specifically enforced covenants not to compete against hairstylists, tele-
phone salespersons, and secretaries. 155
The Texas Supreme Court contrasted Florida's approach to noncompeti-
tion agreements to the four-part test set out in Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim,
Inc., 156 which requires that the covenant:
(i) be necessary for the protection of the promisee,
(ii) not be oppressive to the promisor [including reasonable limita-
tions as to time, territory, and activity],
(iii) not be injurious to the public through prevention of competi-
tion or by depriving the community of needed goods, and
(iv) be enforced only if the promisee gives consideration. 157
The court further noted that Texas courts steadfastly enforce their strict
rules for granting injunctive relief (the showing of a probable right of the
promisee to prevail on the merits and probable irreparable injury to the
promisee) when considering possible remedies for breach of covenants not to
compete.15 8 Based on the significant differences between Florida law and
Texas law regarding enforcement of covenants not to compete, the court
held that the application of Florida law would be contrary to a newly defined
fundamental public policy of Texas, promoting free movement of workers in
the job market. 15 9 Therefore, the court refused to enforce the parties' choice
of law in the agreement. 160
Having determined that Florida law should not apply, the court pro-
ceeded to review the facts of the case and the findings of the jury in light of
Texas law as established in Hill. The court stated that the jury's failure to
find that Wackenhut would suffer irreparable harm as a result of DeSantis's
breach when determining the appropriateness of equitable relief was some-
how tantamount to a finding that the covenant was not necessary for Wack-
enhut's protection. 161 The covenant, therefore, did not satisfy the first
criterion set forth in Hill. 162 Curiously, the failure of the covenant to satisfy
this criterion was found to render the covenant "unreasonable."' ' 63 The
court further noted that DeSantis acquired his special training and knowl-
153. Id. at 619 (citing FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1988)).
154. Id. at 619. The Texas Supreme Court specifically held in Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim,
Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex. 1987), that covenants not to compete may not be enforced if
such covenants impair or restrict the right to engage in a "common calling."
155. Id.
156. 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987).
157. Id.; DeSantis, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 619 (citing Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 170-71).
158. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 619-20.







edge in the security area prior to his employment by Wackenhut. 6 4 In the
opinion of the court, this showed an absence of consideration on the part of
the promisee, notwithstanding Wackenhut's agreement to employ and pay
DeSantis during his employment. 165 Again, however, the failure of the cove-
nant to satisfy the fourth criterion set forth in Hill was said to make the
covenant "unreasonable."'' 66 Based upon these two findings the court held
the covenant not to compete unenforceable under Texas law.1 67
A disturbing aspect of the supreme court's opinion in Wackenhut is the
court's confusion of the standards for granting the equitable relief of injunc-
tion and the standards for enforceability of noncompetition agreements on
the one hand with the criteria for determining whether such covenants are
reasonable on the other. As previously mentioned, the court equated a find-
ing of no irreparable harm to Wackenhut with a failure to demonstrate that
the covenant was necessary for the protection of Wackenhut. This equation
was then used to support the conclusion that the covenant was unreasonable.
Presumably, even if there were no threat of irreparable harm to support in-
junctive relief, the remedy of money damages would be available to Wacken-
hut for DeSantis's breach of his employment agreement. In addition, by
equating unenforceability for lack of consideration with unreasonableness,
the court implied a cause of action against Wackenhut under the Texas Free
Enterprise and Antitrust Act (Antitrust Act). ' 68 This implication is entirely
inconsistent with federal judicial interpretations of section 1 of the Sherman
Act 169 because the court failed to recognize the necessary element of a cause
of action under the Antitrust Act of evaluating the effect of the DeSantis
covenant not to compete upon competition for security services in the Hous-
ton market. Such an evaluation is mandated by section 15.04 of the Anti-
trust Act, which requires the courts to construe the Antitrust Act in
"harmony with federal judicial interpretations of comparable federal anti-
trust statutes."'
7 0
By contrast, the supreme court's opinion in DeSantis is instructive in the
area of conflict of laws. In this case, the supreme court adopted section 187
of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws as the Texas courts' rule
with respect to contractual choices of law. As earlier noted, 17 1 section 187
states in effect that if the parties to a contract provide in the contract that
another state's law will govern their rights and duties under the contract,
that provision will be effective so long as (i) there is a substantial relationship





168. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.40 (Vernon 1987).
169. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
170. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04 (Vernon 1987). In fact, as noted in Bradford
v. New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1974), no court applying the rule of reason
doctrine had yet found an employee covenant not to compete to be in violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act.
171. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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ties and (ii) the application of the chosen law would not be contrary to a
fundamental policy of the forum state, the forum state has a materially
greater interest in the issue than the state whose law is chosen, and the law
of the forum state would apply in the absence of the parties' choice of law. 172
The first feature of this rule, the so called "reasonable relationship" test, is
a feature of previously existing Texas choice of law rules. 173 Further, the
second feature of this rule, the so called "fundamental policy" exception, has
been previously recognized by the Texas courts and does not represent a new
development in Texas choice of law rules.' 74 However, the adoption by the
supreme court of section 187 of the Restatement raises the question what
criteria the Texas courts will apply to determine the fundamental policies of
the state. 175
Questions of enforceability of contractual choices of law frequently have
arisen in the case of contracts that provide for the payment of interest at
rates that would be usurious under the law of the forum state. 176 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has correctly observed that a number of reported
decisions of Texas courts have applied foreign law to determine the maxi-
mum rate of interest that a foreign lender may take, charge, collect, or re-
ceive from a Texas borrower,1 77 with the clear implication that Texas's
usury laws do not embody fundamental policy. Therefore, despite the refer-
ence to "public policy" in a Texas usury statute, 178 the federal courts have
concluded that honoring the parties' choice of foreign law to determine the
maximum lawful rate of interest that may be charged to a Texas borrower
"does not offend fundamental public policy of the State of Texas."'1 79 This
conclusion is instructive because it demonstrates that a legislative pro-
nouncement of "public policy" should not necessarily be read as a statement
of "fundamental policy," within the meaning of section 187 of the Restate-
ment. It is the authors' view that every statute that refers to "public policy"
should not be regarded as a legislative instruction to the courts that the stat-
ute embodies "fundamental policy," as that term is used in Texas, choice of
law rules.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1969).
173. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
174. See, e.g., First Commerce Realty Investors v. K-F Land Co., 617 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
175. Wackenhut does not provide bright lines for determining those contractual obligations
the enforcement of which would be contrary to fundamental policy. Enforcement of a contrac-
tual obligation will offend fundamental policy if the provision's enforcement would be against
good morals or natural justice or, for some other reason, would be prejudicial to the general
interests of Texas citizens. See Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. 1967).
176. See Pederson & Cox, Choice of Law and Usury Limits Under Texas Law and the
National Bank Act, 34 Sw. L.J. 755 (1980).
177. Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744, 751 (5th
Cir. 1981).
178. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1987).
179. Woods-Tucker, 642 F.2d at 753. In addition, there is a sound economic basis for this
conclusion. The characterization of the usury laws of Texas as part of the state's fundamental
policy would elevate parochial issues over the economic benefit to Texas borrowers of free
access to out-of-state sources of capital, with the result that non-Texas institutional lending
markets would be less available to Texas businesses.
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B. Securities Law Development
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson 18o the United States Supreme Court expressly
adopted the standard of materiality set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northwayt 8 ' for claims brought under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, which states
that an omitted fact is material if a substantial likelihood exists that its dis-
closure would have been considered significant by a reasonable investor.18 2
The facts in Basic involved the timing of the disclosure of a potential busi-
ness combination. The Court rejected use of the "agreement-in-principle"
test for establishing the point at which preliminary merger discussions be-
come material.' 83 Instead, the Court embraced the probability magnitude
approach applied in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 18 4 In addition, the
Court found that persons who traded their stock on impersonal, well-devel-
oped markets for securities could, for purposes of claims under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5, use the fraud-on-the-market theory to establish a rebuttable
presumption of reliance.185
Basic, Inc. (Basic), a publicly held company, manufactured chemical
refractories for the steel industry. Combustion Engineering, Inc. (Combus-
tion), which also engaged in the refractory production business, had, for a
number of years, expressed an interest in acquiring Basic. Beginning in Sep-
tember 1976, representatives of Combustion met with officers and directors
of Basic to discuss a possible merger of their companies. On December 18,
1978, Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading in its
shares and released a statement that it had been approached concerning the
possible acquisition of Basic. The following day, Basic's board of directors
approved a tender offer by Combustion, and Basic publicly announced the
approval one day later.
During 1977 and 1978, prior to the tender offer, Basic made three public
statements denying any merger negotiations. The respondents, former Basic
shareholders, sold their shares during the period beginning after the first of
such announcements and ending on December 8, 1978. They subsequently
brought a class action against Basic and its directors under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5, asserting that the three announcements were false and misleading
and had caused the respondents injury because they sold their shares at arti-
ficially depressed prices.
The trial court held that any misstatements were immaterial as a matter of
law because the negotiations in process at the time of the announcements
were "not destined, with reasonable clarity" to become an agreement-in-
principle. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected that view and
held that any statement the company voluntarily released could not be so
180. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
181. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
182. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 983.
183. Id. at 986.
184. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
185. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 988-89.
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incomplete as to mislead. 186 It found that Basic's statement that it knew of
no negotiations or corporate developments that might account for the heavy
trading in its shares did indeed mislead investors, and, although such discus-
sions may not have been material in the absence of denial, they became ma-
terial because of the denial.187
The Supreme Court's analysis began with an acknowledgment that Con-
gress designed the 1934 Act to protect investors against manipulation of
stock prices through a system requiring full disclosure.188 The Court cited
its earlier decision in TSC Industries in which the Court addressed the ques-
tion of whether certain misstatements in a proxy statement should be
deemed material. 189 Recognizing that an overabundance of data burying
shareholders in a large quantity of insignificant information would be self
defeating, the Court in TSC Industries adopted the standard that "an omit-
ted fact is material if a reasonable investor would consider it important in
deciding how to vote; the fact would have to significantly alter the total mix
of information available." 190 The Court in Basic expressly adopted this stan-
dard of materiality as applying to section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions. 191
In adopting the TSC Industries standard, the Supreme Court admitted
that such a standard, in the context of preliminary merger negotiations,
would be difficult to apply because of the inherent speculative nature of such
negotiations. 192 The Court, however, rejected the rule-of-thumb test relied
upon by management that such negotiations become material only when an
agreement-in-principle has been reached, finding unpersuasive each of the
rationales supporting such a rule.193 First, the Court dismissed the rationale
that preliminary discussions are simply too tentative prior to an agreement-
in-principle for an investor to be able to discern the importance of any dis-
closures that are made. 194 The Court distinguished this paternalistic ap-
proach to disclosure from the need to filter out insignificant and essentially
useless information.195 The Court dismissed as irrelevant the second ration-
ale, relating to the importance of secrecy during preliminary negotiations. 196
Interestingly, the Court stated that, in its opinion, the issues raised in Basic
did not go to the timing of disclosure, but rather only to the accuracy and
completeness of disclosure. 197 The Court quickly disposed of the final ra-
tionale, established as essentially a bright-line rule for management's ease of
application, as an improper excuse for ignoring the purpose of the securities
acts. 198
186. 786 F.2d 741, 746 (6th Cir. 1986).
187. Id. at 749.
188. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 982.
189. Id. at 983 (citing TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 438).
190. TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 449.
191. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 983.
192. Id.
193. Id.




198. Id. at 985.
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The Court further explained that the court of appeal's position, which
made material any statement denying the existence of preliminary merger
negotiations, proved "equally insensitive" to the distinction between materi-
ality and the other elements of a cause of action under rule lOb-5.1 99
Rather, the Supreme Court stated that a claimant under rule lOb-5 must
show that a statement or omission is both misleading and material. 2° ° The
materiality approach adopted by the Court, and set forth in Texas Gulf
Sulphur, requires an evaluation of both an event's probability of occurrence
and its significance to the company. 20 1 The Court noted that, to assess the
probability of a merger transaction, the fact finder should look for indicia of
interest at the highest corporate levels, as evidenced by board resolutions
and instructions to investment bankers. 202 A determination of the magni-
tude of the transaction to the issuer would require an examination of the size
of the combining entities and the potential premiums over market value to
be realized by shareholders. 20 3
The Supreme Court next considered the use of the fraud-on-the-market
theory 20 4 to establish reliance on the part of the respondents in their sale of
stock, which reliance would be necessary to support a class action under rule
lOb-5. 20 5 The Court noted that requiring each member of the class to prove
his reliance would have effectively prevented the respondents from bringing
a class action because the individual issues would have overwhelmed the
common ones.20 6 The Court then found that requiring a rule lOb-5 claimant
to demonstrate how he would have acted had there not been a material omis-
sion or misstatement would place on him an unrealistic evidentiary bur-
den.20 7 In a four to two decision, the Supreme Court upheld the appellate
court's acceptance of a rebuttable presumption, supported by the fraud-on-
the-market theory, that the respondents had traded their shares in reliance
on the integrity of a developed market, and that this reliance, though subject
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 986.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 987.
204. In discussing reliance one commentator states:
The purpose of the reliance requirement in face-to-face transactions is to en-
sure that plaintiffs who would not have acted differently if the true information
were known cannot recover. It guarantees that information that does not affect
a buyer's or seller's view of the merits of a transaction cannot form the basis of a
cause of action.
Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded
Securities, 38 Bus. LAW 1, 9-10 (1982).
The fraud-on-the-market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open
and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined
by the available material information regarding the company and its business.
• . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if
they do not directly rely on the misstatements ....
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 988-89.
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to rebuttal, would support a claim under rule lOb-5. 20 8
II. PARTNERSHIPS
During the Survey period, there were few Texas partnership case law de-
velopments. There were even fewer significant partnership developments.
In fact, some of the cases this Article reviews are more significant for their
non-partnership law aspects.
1. Ability of Partnership to Benefit from Fraudulent or Illegal Act of Co-
Partner
a. Ward v. Dallas Texas National Title Company.20 9 Judge Hecht intro-
duced this case with an ominous note: "This is another in the host of law-
suits spawned by the notoriously ill-fortuned condominium development
along Interstate 30 in the Lake Ray Hubbard area."' 210 The partnership is-
sue in this case was whether a person is entitled to recover from his partner a
share of profits generated by the partner's fraudulent scheme. The court
held that one could not recover profits from the fraudulent actions of a part-
ner because the effect would be to allow the recovering party to also benefit
from the fraud.2 11 The court, however, did find that an allegation of a civil
conspiracy to defraud third parties does not, as a matter of law, preclude an
action for damages for loss of the value of property.2 12 The court reversed
the summary judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants and re-
manded the case for further proceedings. 21 3
The plaintiffs in this case owned 60% of the J.A.D.A. Partnership.
J.A.D.A. contracted to buy a tract of property for approximately $245,000.
Two of the other partners, Todd and Wilson, allegedly misrepresented to the
plaintiffs that there were no buyers for the property and that the earnest
money deposit made pursuant to the contract should be forfeited.21 4 The
plaintiffs further alleged that Todd and Wilson, without the plaintiff's
knowledge, acquired the property in the name of J.A.D.A. and then re-sold
it to a third party for approximately $535,000. They also alleged that two
additional conveyances, which took place in the same day, for a total price of
$1,706,000 were part of a civil conspiracy to defraud Empire Savings and
Loan Association.
The dissent agreed with the majority that a partner cannot profit from his
208. Id. at 992.
209. 735 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
210. Id. at 920.
211. Id. at 921.
212. Id. at 921-22. The court distinguished this claim for loss of damages from the claim to
recover profits from the fraudulent transactions. "Although appellants can have no moiety in
any fraud-forged fund, they may have the right to recover damages for any real loss of value of
the property." Id. at 922.
213. Id. at 922.
214. Plaintiffs claimed that they followed Todd's advice not to pay an additional deposit to
extend the closing until buyers could be found, not knowing that Todd's intention was secretly
to purchase the property for resale.
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partner's fraudulent actions. 2 15 They differed, however, on whether, inde-
pendently of that fraud, the claimant partner can show that he was deprived
of his share of profits from the partnership property.2 16 The dissent held
that the partner should not have the right to make that showing.
217
b. Darnell v. Martin.218 The issue in this case was whether a partner con-
victed of theft and ordered to make restitution to a defrauded buyer could
obtain contribution from his co-partner for profits paid to the co-partner
that resulted from the original fraudulent sale. The lower court decision
awarding the partner claiming contribution $11,200 was reversed and ren-
dered. 2 19 The court found that the "criminal conviction and its conse-
quences are personal to the defendant [the plaintiff in this case] and not
chargeable to co-partner unless he had knowledge. ' 220 Interestingly, the
court's holding in Ward v. Dallas Texas National Title Co., discussed above,
would have precluded the innocent partner from suing to collect his share of
profits from the partner who defrauded the buyer if those profits had not
been distributed before the fraud was discovered. 221 The lesson here must be
for the nonfraudulent partner to know as little as possible and get the money
in advance.
2. Construction of Partnership Dissolution Agreement: Baldwin v. New222
This case is really not a partnership law case. Although it involves a part-
nership dissolution agreement, it is simply a contract construction case. Be-
cause it has some interesting issues, however, it will be covered here.
The case turned on the meaning of the term "offer" in a partnership disso-
lution agreement under which Baldwin would be paid his share of the sales
price for a building if his co-partner, New, received an "offer to purchase"
the building within a certain period of time. Baldwin presented three "of-
fers" to New within the prescribed time, but New rejected each as not being
an "offer to purchase" the building.
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment granted to
New by the trial court on the basis that the "offers" submitted by Baldwin
were not contracts of sale but, rather, were options. 223 The two proposals
that satisfied the monetary prerequisites of the dissolution agreement con-
tained "free look" provisions giving the prospective buyer the unfettered
right to terminate the contract during the sixty days after the contract was
215. Id. at 923.
216. Id. at 923-24.
217. Id. (Whitham, J., dissenting). "I conclude that the [plaintiff's] complain ... that a
conspiracy by the [defendants] denied the (plaintiffs] an opportunity to participate in a scheme
to defraud Empire Savings and Loan of the amount of $1,706,158 by inflating the value of the
... land .... Surely, we have not reached the point where a person may recover damages for
being denied the right to defraud." Id.
218. 740 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied).
219. Id. at 16.
220. Id.
221. 735 S.W.2d at 921.
222. 736 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied).
223. Id.
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executed, and limited the seller's remedies on a buyer's default to a retention
of the earnest money deposit. No right to bring an action for specific per-
formance or damages existed, even after the free look period in the contract
expired. The sole remedy was to retain the earnest money. The court, there-
fore, held that under settled Texas case law the proposals at issue were no
more than option contracts. 224 Furthermore, under Texas law the word "of-
fer" means a proposal that produces a binding contract on its acceptance,
enforceable by any party to it.225 The court found that the offers in this case,
even if accepted, would produce buyer's option contracts, not bilateral con-
tracts enforceable by either party.226
Because the proposals described in Baldwin are typical of what would be
termed "contracts of sale" in the Texas real estate industry, the proposals
probably satisfied the parties' intent for purposes of the dissolution agree-
ment. The court, however, found the terms of the dissolution agreement to
be unambiguous and, therefore, disallowed any parol evidence of the parties'
intent.227 On the other hand, there exists a somewhat more compelling ar-
gument in support of the court's holding, which the court failed to make.
Under the dissolution agreement, Baldwin was entitled to be paid even if the
property was not sold pursuant to the "offer to purchase. ' 228 Therefore,
requiring New to pay Baldwin full value on Baldwin's production of an op-
tion contract under which New's sole recourse against the prospective buyer
in the event of the latter's default was to retain the earnest money, is argua-
bly unfair. 229
3. Forfeiture of Partnership Interest: Brewer v. Tehuacana Venture,
Ltd. 230
Brewer involved a suit by a limited partner against the limited partnership
and the general partner for an accounting and for damages equal to the lim-
ited partner's share of profits resulting from the sale of partnership property.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding in favor of the general
partner and the partnership. 23 1
In this case, the limited partner refused to fund a mandatory "cash call"
made by the general partner on behalf of the partnership. The limited part-
nership agreement contained a procedure to deal with such a default. The
agreement permitted the general partner to purchase the defaulting partner's
224. Id. at 151 (citing Hott v. Pearcy/Christon, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
225. Id. at 150 (citing Lede v. Aycock, 630 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
226. Id. at 151.
227. Id. at 153.
228. New had the right either to (i) sell the property pursuant to the contract produced by
Baldwin, or (ii) pay Baldwin the amount Baldwin would have received under the agreement
had the sale occurred.
229. In other words, the court might have said that the only type of contract for which
Baldwin was entitled to full payment on New's election not to sell was one under which New
has a right to sue the buyer for the full sales price if the buyer defaulted.
230. 737 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
231. Id. at 350.
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interest by paying the amount of the cash call within ten days after the de-
fault. If the general partner failed to timely exercise that option, it had an
additional thirty-day period during which it could substitute another person
for the defaulting partner. If that substitution did not occur, the general
partner could then dissolve the limited partnership and wind up its affairs.
Alternatively, the general partner could waive the default and avoid dissolu-
tion and winding up.
Shortly after the limited partner refused to comply with the cash call, the
partnership contracted to sell its property. The property was later sold pur-
suant to that contract. Apparently feeling that the timing of the loss of his
interest and the sale of the property were not entirely coincidental, the lim-
ited partner sued for his share of the sale proceeds, claiming that had he
known of the sale he would have paid his contribution. The limited partner
makes a rational argument. Most people would pay $2,050 for the' right to
shortly thereafter receive $21,764.23. The jury, however, found that the ini-
tial contract regarding the sale occurred almost two months after the cash
call was made and more than two weeks after the limited partner's final
default.232
The court of appeals concluded that the general partner's failure to strictly
observe the limited partnership agreement's default procedure was immate-
rial.233 The court found that the general partner purchased the limited part-
ner's interest shortly after the time period prescribed by the agreement and
that the delay was principally caused by the general partner's allowance of
additional time for the limited partner to make the cash call.234
Two of the court's findings are significant. First, the court found irrele-
vant the general partner's failure to amend the certificate of limited partner-
ship to reflect the general partner's acquisition of the interest of the limited
partner.235 The limited partner apparently offered that failure as further evi-
dence that the general partner had not acquired the limited partner's interest
before the sale of the partnership property. 236 The court reasoned that be-
cause the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act 237 does not require strict
compliance in the formation of a limited partnership, an amendment to the
certificate of limited partnership to indicate that the general partner
purchased the limited partner's interest was not required for the acquisition
to be effective. 238 This result may be correct considering that the limited
partner did not technically lose his status as a limited partner, but the court's
stated rationale seems a little strained.
Second, the court rejected the limited partner's argument that the court
should refuse to enforce a forfeiture if language allowing the forfeiture can be
232. Id. at 352.
233. Id. at 351.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 352.
237. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 3(b) (Vernon 1970).
238. 737 S.W.2d at 352.
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construed to provide a different result.239 Although the court referred else-
where in the opinion to apurchase of the limited partner's interest24° (which
is more consistent with the language of the partnership agreement than the
concept of forfeiture), the court implicitly acknowledged that a forfeiture
resulted here by finding that a forfeiture occurring in compliance with the
clear language of an agreement approved by all the partners was
enforceable. 241
4. Lender as Partner: Anderson v. Jasper Federal Savings and Loan
Association 242
Anderson is more interesting to lenders who have taken an equity or part-
nership interest in their borrower's business or in the borrower itself, than to
those interested in partnership law issues. In connection with an interim
construction loan to build a motel, the borrower in Anderson formed a lim-
ited partnership with an affiliate of the lender giving that affiliate a 50%
limited partnership interest. The partnership agreement provided that the
property could be sold only by the affirmative vote of partners holding a
51% interest in the partnership. The borrower contended that after the
completion of the motel he found a number of willing buyers, several of
whom would have paid enough to repay the lender's loan and provide a
profit to the partners, but that the limited partner refused to vote in favor of
any of those sales. A successor to the original lender later foreclosed on the
property for failure to pay the construction loan.
The borrower claimed that the lender had charged usury by requiring the
formation of the limited partnership and then refusing to consent to a sale of
the property. As to this claim the jury found that (i) the 50% limited part-
nership interest did not have ascertainable value at the time the loan was
made, (ii) the limited partner was the alter ego of the lender, (iii) the lender
and the lender's affiliate (the limited partner) unreasonably prevented the
borrower from performing his obligation to repay the loan, (iv) the plaintiff
was not damaged by being prevented from repaying the loan, and (v) the
lender and the limited partner did not intentionally violate a duty of good
faith and fair dealing. 243
The court rejected the plaintiff's apparent argument that the alter ego
finding was, itself, a sufficient basis for liability, stating that alter ego corpo-
rations were not themselves illegal.24 The court found that either entity, or
both, were exercising a right to approve or disapprove of a sale of the prop-
239. Id.
240. Id. at 351.
241. Id. at 352. The forfeiture occurred when Brewer failed to meet the cash call with
regard to the property in question. In accordance with the partnership agreement, Brewer's
default resulted in his loss of his partnership interest to the partner who covered Brewer's cash
call. Because that occurred before the property was sold, it effectively resulted in a forfeiture
of Brewer's interest in the sale of the property.
242. 738 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ denied).
243. Id. at 770.
244. Id. at 771 (citing Long Falls Realty Co. v. Anchor Elec. Co., 405 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, no writ).
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erty that was granted in an agreement approved by the plaintiff.245 The
court offered this same rationale to reject the plaintiff's argument that the
lender's unreasonable prevention of the plaintiff's performance of his part of
the obligation to repay the note excused the plaintiff from that obligation. 246
It is hard to find sympathy for the plaintiff when the lender did not seek a
deficiency and, partly because of the advances he had previously taken, the
plaintiff suffered no damages. 247
The dissent is, perhaps, better reasoned, but would produce a result that
would cause lenders to lose sleep at night. The dissent would hold that be-
cause the jury found that the lender and its affiliate, the partner of the bor-
rower, unreasonably prevented the plaintiff from repaying the loan, Texas
law would excuse payment of the $587,000 loan. 248 Furthermore, the dis-
sent would give to the plaintiff one-half ($212,500) of the amount the lender
received on a subsequent sale of the property ($425,000), plus attorney's
fees. 249 In this author's judgment, that is a completely unjustifiable windfall
for the borrower. The loan was fully repaid through a sale (albeit a foreclo-
sure sale), there was no action for a deficiency (the lender bid $160,000 more
than the property was worth), and the jury effectively found that the bor-
rower suffered no damages because he realized his "profit" in advance by
taking numerous draws of funds from the partnership.
One interesting note is that the majority opinion was written by Chief
Justice Dies, the same judge who wrote the opinion in Halter v. Allied
Merchants Bank,250 which is decidedly a non-lender decision.25'
245. Id. at 770.
246. Id. at 771.
247. Apparently the lender bid the full amount of the loan ($587,710.95) at the foreclosure
sale when the property was only valued at $425,000. Additionally, the borrower had used the
loan proceeds to pay his salary, as well as incidental personal items.
248. 738 S.W.2d at 772 (Burgess, J., dissenting).
249. Id.
250. 751 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied).
251. In Halter, although the court held for the lender, it did so purely on procedural
grounds. Instead of reserving the issue for a later date when it was properly before the court,
the Halter court went out of its way to reject the bank's argument that it was entitled to
summary judgment on its lawsuit for a deficiency against the borrower based on established
case law that even gross inadequacy of consideration paid at a foreclosure sale is not enough,
by itself, to justify setting a foreclosure sale aside. The court found the bank's reliance on the
Texas Supreme Court case of American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.
1975), to be misguided because that case did not involve the issue of a suit for a deficiency but,
rather, only an action to set aside a foreclosure sale. 751 S.W.2d at 287.
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